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Modern society is striving for digital connectivity that demands information security. As an
emerging technology, printed electronics is a key enabler for novel device types with free
form factors, customizability, and the potential for large-area fabrication while being seam-
lessly integrated into our everyday environment. At present, information security is mainly
based on software algorithms that use pseudo random numbers. In this regard, hardware-
intrinsic security primitives, such as physical unclonable functions, are very promising to
provide inherent security features comparable to biometrical data. Device-specific, random
intrinsic variations are exploited to generate unique secure identifiers. Here, we introduce a
hybrid physical unclonable function, combining silicon and printed electronics technologies,
based on metal oxide thin film devices. Our system exploits the inherent randomness of
printed materials due to surface roughness, film morphology and the resulting electrical
characteristics. The security primitive provides high intrinsic variation, is non-volatile, scal-
able and exhibits nearly ideal uniqueness.
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The term Internet of Things (IoT) describes the ubiquitouspresence of interconnected devices exchanging sensitivedata, often through open communication channels, which
can be compromised. In this era of digitization, device identity
and encryption techniques are more than ever vital factors for
ensuring data security, proper authentication, and secure com-
munication1–8. Many security solutions, such as the asymmetric
key establishment methods9,10, are based on mathematically
proven foundations and significantly rely on random numbers.
The trustworthiness of the encryption depends on the quality of
the random number generators (RNGs) used for the generation
of public and private keys. Ideally, the generation of random
numbers uses the entropy of a high-quality randomness source.
Various software-based computational or hardware-based meth-
ods exist for RNGs, each more or less satisfying the requirements
for cryptographic applications. Fast symmetric cryptographic
algorithms, such as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)11,
have also been used and offer a high level of security, if the
established private key is truly secret. As a consequence, inter-
linked security solutions in software as well as in hardware are
increasingly in demand. Especially for IoT-enabled devices, which
are often subject to strict design and performance constraints,
hardware-based security is essential.
To tackle the aforementioned challenges, hardware-intrinsic
security solutions based on unique device parameters are
deployed. These security primitives are referred to as physical
unclonable functions (PUFs), which are used for identification,
authentication, and cryptographic key generation12–15. Among the
main advantages of PUFs to be used as root of trust in the IoT, is
their unique and unclonable response as well as their memory-less
circuit architecture making them less vulnerable to invasive
attacks. Historically, initial studies regarding PUFs were carried
out by exploiting imperfect surface speckle patterns16 as an
entropy source. One major drawback is the high equipment
overhead for key generation and readout, making this PUF
approach inapplicable for most application fields. In the next step,
silicon-based PUFs (Si-PUFs), leveraging intrinsic manufacturing-
induced variations of integrated circuits (ICs), were studied and
present a well-established PUF implementation5,12–14,17,18. Si-
PUFs can be further classified as bi-stable19–21, delay-based22, or
analog PUFs23,24, depending on the underlying variation source,
such as dopants, defects, and geometrical device dimensions.
Furthermore, Si-PUFs often suffer from reduced entropy25,
compared with additive manufacturing techniques. Also, IC fab-
rication is limited to a few foundries worldwide. In many appli-
cation domains where the entire design and fabrication are
sensitive, globalization of foundries is a major risk. This invites
counterfeiting and tampering of the IC or readout of the Si-PUF-
specific keys by third parties before the official deployment by the
end user. In general, lithography-based silicon technologies face a
cost barrier for many envisioned applications and devices in the
scope of the IoT. Furthermore, with the ever-increasing demand
in electronic devices for the IoT, electronic waste (e-waste), that
presents a substantial ecological problem up to now26–28, is even
expected to increase27,28.
In the near future, emerging technologies such as printed
electronics (PE) will further expand the IoT by enabling features
like new form factors, flexible substrates, stretchability of the
hardware circuits, transparency, and large-area sensing while
providing low-cost fabrication29–31. PE can help to tackle e-waste
by efficient use of non-toxic, and bio-degradable materials to
empower a sustainable future regarding “green electronics”32,33.
Recently, PUFs based on novel materials, such as quantum dots
(Liu et al.34), biological human T cells (Wali et al.25) were pre-
sented, mostly utilizing optical inspections for key generation.
Other works on promising novel materials and methods
concentrate on fingerprint-alike intrinsic counterfeit protection
using random surface patterns25,34–41. These approaches need
high-cost equipment such as microscopes, image processing, and
optical readout for reliable key generation. Also, optical PUFs
may face challenges when integrated into signal- and software-
layers, which are mainly realized as electronic systems. Another
direction in PUF research is to use novel materials and methods
and adapt the concepts of Si-PUF architectures42–50. Emerging
technologies, such as PE, enable decentralized, customizable
manufacturing of small and mid-size volumes, which can help to
establish “root of trust” in the manufacturing supply chain.
Furthermore, owing to the manifold possibilities in design,
materials, and substrates it offers a core complexity with many
sources of entropy, which can be exploited for hardware-based
security. Owing to the additive manufacturing process of printed
active devices, larger device variations are expected, compared
with lithographically structured devices. The source of variations
can be numerous, reaching from the discrete droplet size of the
printed ink, the surface roughness of printed layers and the
quality of interfaces between layers in general, up to scaling errors
in the channel width-to-length ratio due to the manufacturing
process and physical layout of a design, to name but a few51–56.
In this work, we leverage the sources of entropy in printed
devices to generate a unique unclonable response function. We
develop unclonable, unique PUF security primitives by combin-
ing the advantages of PE and Si-based technologies. The security
primitives are fabricated through inkjet-printing of the PUF core
using electrolyte-gated transistors (EGTs). The surrounding
control logic that harvests the intrinsic variations of the printed
PUF core is composed of Si-based technology. So far, related
printed PUF implementations remain limited to standalone, often
single device implementations, neither addressing the system level
integration nor including statistical validity. With this work, we
overcome the existing limitations with an integrated hybrid PUF
implementation for 28-bit, which is scalable to arbitrary key bit
width and shows superior security features. We have further
performed a statistical analysis based on experimental large-scale
characterization for important PUF security metrics, such as
uniqueness, bit aliasing, reliability, and bit errors. In addition, the
design has the potential in the near future of being fully printed,
including the Si-based logic periphery circuits, once inkjet-
printed circuit technology evolves further. To the best of our
knowledge, designing, fabricating, and embedding a printed PUF
core into a system level environment as well as the experimental
analysis of PUF security metrics has not been presented before.
Results
Full fabrication of hybrid PUF security primitive. The hybrid
(i.e., Si-based control logic and printed PUF core) PUF system
and its components are shown in Fig. 1a–d. The printed PUF
core, as an intrinsic variation source, is embedded into an
addressing and readout environment, as shown in Supplementary
Fig. 1. The hybrid PUF evaluation and unique response genera-
tion principle is shown in Fig. 1e–h and Supplementary Fig. 2.
The PUF core circuit consists of an inkjet-printed inverter array
realized with EGTs and resistive indium-tin oxide (ITO) meander
structures as load resistors, as shown in Fig. 1b. EGTs operate at
low voltages (≤2.0 V) and show circuit performances ranging
from several hundreds of Hz until kHz57–60. Studies on EGT
variations and device variation modeling have also been studied
prior to this work61,62. In our hybrid PUF approach, we exploit
the implicit random variations caused by the material composi-
tion, layer thickness and roughness, as well as interface properties
between several printed layers as a source of randomness for
hardware security (see Fig. 1d). These variations are reflected in
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the electrical characteristics of our printed EGTs and corre-
sponding inverter structures. By addressing two inverters
(Invak ; Invbk) simultaneously and comparing their output vol-
tages, one output bit is generated based on the voltage difference
ΔVout. To enable a comprehensive understanding of the
challenge-response mechanism and the corresponding effects that
lead to the response bits, we also track the individual inverter
output voltages at the comparator input with an analog-to-digital
converter (ADC). The full mechanism of the challenge-response
generation is shown in Fig. 1h. The exact challenge configuration
to generate a 28-bit response is further described in the Supple-
mentary Fig. 2.
As substrate, we have used ITO-covered 20 mm × 20mm glass
(PGO CEC020S) with a layer thickness of 100 nm. After laser
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Fig. 1 Integrated hybrid PUF circuit and corresponding challenge-response mechanism. a Schematic illustration of the hybrid PUF with the printed core
substrate mounted onto the control logic printed circuit board (PCB). b Zoom in of one PUF core inverter consisting of a resistor-electrolyte-gated
transistor-pair. c Schematic EGT top-gate bottom-contact stack structure. d Scanning electron microscopy (SEM) image of a printed EGT, which shows the
non-uniform semiconductor-/electrolyte interface. The small inlet picture shows the ITO film thickness with the known 100 nm layer thickness as a
reference. The inkjet-printed (In2O3) layer is determined to be ≈ 50 nm. On the ITO layer, also an (In2O3) film can be seen. e Two examples of printed PUF
cores A and B fabricated with equal processes. f Evaluation of the random variations caused by the fabrication process in terms of applying the same
challenge to the PUFs A and B and extracting their unique responses. g Digital timing diagram representation of the unique PUF responses {r0r1…r27} for
two PUF cores A and B, respectively. h High-level schematic of the challenge and response generation procedure. The inverter pair (Invak ; Invbk ) addressing
is provided by the permutation-based sub-challenge ck. The comparator output generates the corresponding sub-response rk, based on the voltage
difference ΔVout between Invak and Invbk .
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ablation, the resulting ITO structures present the electrodes and
resistor structures used in the PUF core design, employing eight
inverters. In general, the scalable design of the hybrid PUF is not
limited to eight PUF core inverters and can be extended if needed.
The placement of the components follows a symmetrical
alignment, where the input–output (I/O) terminals of all core
inverters are connected to bonding pads. This design approach
eliminates the need for printed crossovers by shifting this
complexity to the Si-based system. A large width of the I/O
terminal wiring was chosen to reduce the resistivity of the ITO
strips. Also, this increases the manufacturing yield for the printed
PUF cores. The EGT transistor stack is designed as a top-gate
bottom-contact structure, as displayed in Fig. 1c. Fig. 1d displays
the corresponding scanning electron microscopy (SEM) image of
a printed EGT, showing the non-uniform semiconductor-/
electrolyte interface as intrinsic variation source. The smaller
inlet picture shows the layer thickness as a reference. Fig. 2 shows
the manufacturing process and integration workflow for the
printed PUF core. In the first step, an ITO glass substrate is
structured via laser ablation, using a Trumpf TruMicro 5000
picosecond laser. The structured ITO layer includes the full
electrical signal routing of the PUF core such as I/O terminal
routing strips, resistive meander structures and the drain, gate,
and source terminals of the printed EGTs, respectively.
After cleaning the structured glass substrate in an ultra-sonic
bath with acetone and isopropanol (1:1) for 1 hour, an indium
(III) nitrate hydrate (H2InN3O10)-based precursor is inkjet-
printed between the transistors’ drain and source electrodes.
Following an annealing step at 400 ˚C, the indium-oxide (In2O3)
semiconductor thin-film channel is formed63, and a composite-
solid-polymer-electrolyte (CSPE) is inkjet-printed as a gate
insulator. In a final step, poly(3,4-ethylenedioxythiophene):poly
(styrenesulfonate) (PEDOT:PSS) is inkjet-printed as the top-gate
electrode material. The precursor and ink formulations can be
seen in the Methods section. All inkjet-printing steps are
performed with a Fujitsu Dimatix DMP-2850 inkjet-printer.
The hybrid PUF’s control logic includes the addressing and
readout circuitry for the printed PUF core and is assembled with
discrete Si-based components (see Supplementary Fig. 1 and
Supplementary Note 1). To enable large-scale characterization, an
adapter PCB has been designed that allows printed PUF cores
with a fixed control logic to be interchanged (see Supplementary
Figs. 1 and 8). The integration process of the printed PUF cores
onto Si-based adapter PCBs is derived from the silicon flip-chip
mounting process64. Conductive interconnection between the
ITO-based printed PUF core conductive layer I/O terminals and
the gold-coated contact pads on the adapter PCB is implemented
by a low-temperature curing conductive adhesive. This approach
allows mounting at ambient room temperature, thereby dimin-
ishing potential negative impact on the printed devices during the
integration process. Automated integration includes adhesive
dispensing on the adapter PCBs and precise alignment and
mounting of the PUF core substrates on the PCBs. The proposed
framework allows for various different technology nodes to be
seamlessly integrated, in our case printed EGTs and discrete Si-
based CMOS circuitry. The standardized interface between
printing technology and PCB also permits the evaluation PCB
to be interchanged, enabling large-scale automated characteriza-
tion of several printed PUF cores, for example, for statistical
evaluation in a real system environment.
Printed PUF core analog signal level characteristics. In general,
a full readout of the hybrid PUF includes all PUF core inverter
address pair permutations. For eight inverters, the maximum bit-
width Lmax ¼ 28 for a single PUF response is calculated by the
binomial coefficient without repetitions according to Eq. (1). In
the approach used here, we apply all inverter address permuta-
tions subsequently in sub-challenges, thereby generating the
corresponding sub-response bits, and concatenate them to obtain
the full PUF response as a digital bit sequence.
Lmax ¼





To obtain more PUF responses, the number of inverter address
combinations in the challenge could be decreased, which splits the
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Fig. 2 Fabrication and integration process of the printed PUF core into the PCB. a Structuring by laser ablation of the PUF core circuit including routing
strips, resistors, I/O and transistor terminals. b Inkjet-printing of the EGT layers, such as In2O3 (channel), electrolyte (gate insulation), and top gate
(PEDOT:PSS). c Flip-chip adopted mounting process of the inkjet-printed PUF core onto the adapter PCB using conductive adhesive.
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challenge-response pair (CRP) space into various units. However, it
must be noted that this approach also decreases the bit-width of the
single PUF responses. For the following investigations of the
fabricated hybrid PUFs on the analog signal level, we apply different
test cases in defined by temperatures in the range of Tamb=
{20 ˚C, 40 ˚C, 60 ˚C} as well as controlled relative humidity (RH)
and PUF core supply voltage conditions (VDDcore). This allows to
visualize the temperature dependencies of the PUF core inverter
voltage transfer curves. All measurements were performed in a
Weiss WK3 climatic chamber to obtain a controlled operational
environment.
Fig. 3a–c show the voltage transfer curves Vout= f(Vin) of 120
inverters taken from 15 fabricated printed PUF cores as statistical
violin and box plot with different temperature conditions, (a)
Tamb= 20 ˚C, (b) Tamb= 40 ˚C, and (c) Tamb= 60 ˚C, a stable
relative humidity at RH= 50%, and PUF core supply voltage at
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Fig. 3 Printed PUF core voltage characteristics. a Inverter voltage transfer curve including all 120 fabricated inverters at a relative humidity of 50%, a PUF
core supply voltage of 1 V and at 20 ˚C. The maximum output voltage variation is reached around Vin= 0.4 V. b Inverter voltage transfer curve including all
120 fabricated inverters at a relative humidity of 50%, a PUF core supply voltage of 1 V and at 40 ˚C. c Inverter voltage transfer curve including all 120
fabricated inverters at a relative humidity of 50%, a PUF core supply voltage of 1 V and at 60 ˚C. d Voltage difference levels ΔVcomp at the comparator input
terminals including all PUF core inverter pair combinations at the ambient temperature 20˚C. The data shown in a–d is visualized as box plot as well as
violin plot (light red shaded area). The red line in the box plot marks the median value for Vout. The upper end of the box in the box plot represents the 75
percentile of the Vout distribution and the bottom side the 25 percentile. The maximum is at the 95 percentile, whilst the minimum is at the respective five
percentile. The violin plot includes the full data range for Vout and helps to visualize the data distribution more clearly. The blue dashed line in a–c is a fit
over the corresponding median values with a fourth-degree polynomial.
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VDDcore ¼ 1 V. For an ambient temperature of 20 ˚C, the
inverters’ maximum output voltage variation is at Vin= 0.4 V, as
shown in Fig. 3a. With increasing temperature, an increase in the
transistor drain current ID is expected, which leads to a reduction
of Vout, as can be seen in Fig. 3b and 3c. The light red shaded
violin plots at each Vin cover the complete Vout measurement data.
The plots indicate that some inverters do not show the expected
voltage transfer curves. Nonetheless, such potential malfunction-
ing of single inverter cells does not affect PUF operation in a
negative manner as long as the PUF responses can be reproduced,
which is verified experimentally later in this paper.
Furthermore, Fig. 3d shows the corresponding voltage
differences at the comparator input terminals (ΔVcomp) over the
test case P1 as violin and box plot. At Vin= 0.4 V the median
value for Vout is −48 mV, and the measured samples
interquartile range is at 284.1 mV, respectively. We can conclude
that biasing the hybrid PUF around this Vin is beneficial, as most
probably a high-voltage difference ΔVcomp can be expected. This
satisfies the constraint that the inverter voltage difference levels
ΔVout are much larger than the control logic’s systematic error
ΔVϵ (ΔVout≫ ΔVϵ)65.
Security metrics. We evaluate the security metrics of our fabri-
cated hybrid PUFs by using the uniqueness, bit aliasing, and
reliability metrics proposed by Maiti et al.66. To investigate the
uniqueness and reliability metrics further, we evaluate the bit
errors in the PUF responses that occur over time. Detailed defi-
nitions of these security metrics can be found in the section
Methods. In the following discussion, we apply various test cases
for evaluation. These test cases compromise various temperatures
with Tamb= {20 ˚C, 40 ˚C, 60 ˚C}, relative humidity conditions
RH= {45%, 50%, 55%} and different PUF core supply voltages
VDDcore ¼ f0:9 V; 1:0 V; 1:1 Vg. A tabular overview of all
resulting test case combinations can be found in the Supple-
mentary Table 1. We consider changes in RH in our evaluations,
because it impacts the functionality of the EGTs67. In the fol-
lowing, nominal conditions are defined at an ambient tempera-
ture of Tamb= 20 ˚C, relative humidity RH= 50%, and
VDDcore ¼ 1:0 V, and used as a reference in security metrics
evaluation. All measurements are repeated 20 times under con-
trolled environmental conditions.
Uniqueness. The uniqueness metric shows the ability to differ-
entiate PUF instances from each other. When applying the same
challenge to different PUF instances, all responses are expected to
be unique. The ideal value for the uniqueness metric is 50%,
which means that all PUF responses are distinguishable. For our
evaluation, we use 15 fabricated hybrid PUF core instances and
operate them under nominal conditions. The inverter input-
biasing voltage is set to Vin= 0.4 V, as explored in our prior
simulations, to be the best operating point for our PUF design65.
The experimental results, together with the outcome of the
simulations, are shown in Fig. 4a. The mean value and standard
deviation of the uniqueness for the measured responses are μm=
51.1% and σm= 15.5%, respectively. These values are in good
agreement with both the simulation and the theoretical ideal
value of the uniqueness metric, which is 50% and means that the
PUF entities can be distinguished.
Bit aliasing. Bit aliasing (BA) will occur if various PUF instances
produce the same response when stimulated with the same
challenge. In this case, PUF authentication results in false posi-
tives, which degrades the operational capabilities of a PUF for use
in applications such as secure device identification. In general, bit
aliasing is caused by internal biases, which lead to fixed bits that
in the worst case never change their binary values. In general, the
bit aliasing metric is associated with the uniqueness metric, as
internal bitwise biases lead to multiple appearances of PUF
responses for different challenges. As a result, the uniqueness of
the CRPs degrades. To evaluate the bit aliasing metric, we utilize
the same CRP data obtained from our uniqueness tests under
nominal conditions. The inverter input-biasing voltage remains at
the theoretically best operating point achieved at Vin= 0.4 V65.
Fig. 4b shows the distribution of the calculated bit aliasing values
obtained separately for each response bit position. The mean
value of the bit aliasing calculated using the measured PUF
responses is μm= 44.5% with a standard deviation of σm= 9.3%.
The plot also proves the statistical coverage with the simulation
results obtained in our prior work65. The experimentally obtained
mean bit aliasing value of μm= 44.5% indicates a bias of the PUF
responses towards logic ‘0’. However, the simulated theoretical bit
aliasing for the presented hybrid PUF is μs= 49.8%. This shows
that the bit aliasing can be improved to provide a close to true
random bit sequence, suitable for cryptographic applications with
the presented approach. The hybrid PUF’s response entropy and
its capabilities regarding identification is shown in Supplementary
Fig. 4 and Supplementary Note 1.
Bit errors and reliability. To verify the robustness of our fabri-
cated PUFs regarding their response stability, extensive testing
under various controlled environmental conditions in a cli-
matic chamber is executed. Standard reliability measures con-
sider PUF responses generated at certain operating conditions
and calculate their bitwise deviations to a fixed reference
response, extracted under nominal conditions by utilizing the
hamming distance (HD). The HD of two binary strings of equal
length is the number of positions with different bit values. This
evaluation procedure assumes that the response bits remain
stable, if the operational conditions, such as ambient tem-
perature, relative humidity, and supply voltage do not change
over time/iterations. Therefore, noise-inflicted, time-dependent
operational effects such as flipping bits are not further eval-
uated. However, this is not the case for circuits, whose internal
characteristics might change slightly during operation because
of non-ideal devices and other factors, such as aging.
We measure in the ambient temperature range Tamb=
{20 ˚C, 40 ˚C, 60 ˚C}, fixed relative humidity RH= 50%, and
inverter supply voltage VDDcore ¼ 1:0 V. For our evaluations,
we increase the inverter input-biasing voltage in the range of
Vin= {0.0 V, . . . , 1.0 V} in 0.2 V steps. In Fig. 4c, the markers
show the calculated mean bit error values. The plot shows that
the bit errors strongly increase between Vin= (0.8 V, 1.0 V).
This effect appears because the PUF core inverters have already
reached their logical low levels, where variations are small.
Nonetheless, a single flipped bit in a 28-bit PUF response has a
relative impact of ≈ 3.6%. As the measured relative bit errors of
the 28-bit responses are ≤ 2%, in average there is less than one
bit flip per response. In the following the reliability metric is
discussed. In total, we operate four fabricated hybrid PUFs in a
climatic chamber under all previously defined operating con-
ditions. The inverter input-biasing voltage is consecutively set
to the values Vin= {0.3 V, 0.4 V, 0.5 V}, in order to investigate
the robustness around the best operating point determined in
our prior simulations. We repeat the response extraction 20
times for each test case to achieve expressive statistics. Fig. 4d
shows the reliability values for each of the tested PUF cores.
The thick black line represents a second-degree regression
model fit of the calculated mean reliability values that reaches
its maximum of 78.5% at Vin= 0.4 V. It should be noted that no
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passivation layer for active component protection from envir-
onmental impacts was available at the time of fabrication. We
expect the reliability values to be higher, once proper passiva-
tion is introduced for EGTs. To further investigate the relia-
bility of our fabricated devices without the impact of changing
ambient temperatures, we create the plot shown in Fig. 4e.
The mean reliability is above 90%, which indicates that values
close to ideal can be achieved for our hybrid PUF. Furthermore,
the impacts of altered relative humidity and inverter supply
voltage VDDcore in the range of ±10% are low, respectively.
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Fig. 4f shows that the reliability values are not heavily influ-
enced by the tested relative humidity variations. This plot
shows the reliability values for the four tested PUF cores with
fixed relative humidity at 50%. The data points and curves are
almost equal to Fig. 4d.
Discussion
In conclusion, we have presented a hybrid PUF incorporating
an inkjet-printed core circuit as an intrinsic source of entropy,
integrated into a silicon-based CMOS system environment. The
embedded system can generate 28-bit PUF responses and
enables large-scale characterization as well as error tracking on
both the digital and analog signal levels. In contrast to other
PE-based PUF approaches, the hybrid PUF design presented
here covers the full system level integration and breaks through
the limitations of former device level-only implementations.
Potential target applications in the security domain as well as
benchmarking security metrics span the full range from con-
ventional electronics to emerging technology fields, as PE,
which enables low-cost manufacturing. Digitally controlled
additive and solution-processed manufacturing techniques
provide a high degree of flexibility in materials and unique
intrinsic variation properties beneficial for fabricating PUF
circuits. Flexible substrates in the future also enable new design
patterns and integration capabilities, which pave the way for
favorable applications in the IoT.
To investigate the security metrics of the hybrid PUF system
and to assess the performance of our fabricated hybrid PUFs,
we operated and characterized them in the controlled envir-
onment of a climatic chamber. In detail, we tested the hybrid
PUFs under the impact of temperature, humidity, and supply
voltage variations. With a mean uniqueness value of 51.1% and
a mean bit aliasing value of 44.5%, the proposed hybrid PUFs
generate unique responses that are distinguishable. The bit
error evaluation shows that the PUF responses remain stable
when regenerated successively at various ambient temperatures,
with bit errors ≤2%. To show the robustness around the best
operating point obtained from simulations in our prior work,
we have shown reliability evaluation for the inverter input-
biasing voltages Vin= {0.3 V, 0.4 V, 0.5 V}. The mean reliability
value at the best operating point is at 78.5%. However, the
reliability score can be expected to be higher once passivation to
protect the EGTs from environmental influences has been
introduced. Even with this figure of merit, it is still a major
advance compared with the state-of-the-art research. We also
investigated the reproducibility of the PUF challenge-response
mechanism by calculating the bit errors that occur over time of
operation.
Compared with other printed PUFs, our current system shows
the largest PUF response bit-width and sufficient statistics to
experimentally evaluate security metrics based on characteriza-
tion results. The hybrid PUF presented here as a scalable, fully
integrated system is a promising approach for future utilization
in emerging security-related application fields such as identifi-
cation, multi-factor authentication, and cryptographic key
generation. In addition, inkjet-printing technology enables a root
of trust to be established in the PUF supply chain through
decentralized manufacturing, which implies a substantial pro-
gress in providing trustworthy security primitives. Regarding
future work in the area of printed PUFs several points need to be
further investigated. As shown in our results, temperature sta-
bility needs to be improved to increase reliability and to enable
bit-stable PUF responses.
Methods
Materials. As a printing substrate, a commercially available 20 mm × 20 mm ITO
glass (PGO CEC020S) with a layer thickness of 100 nm and a sheet resistance of
R□= 20Ω is used. The materials used for the EGTs are as follows: Indium (III)
nitrate hydrate (99.9% trace metal basis, MW= 300.83 , Sigma-Aldrich), Glycerol
(MW= 92.09 g mol−1, Merck KGaA), Dimethyl sulfoxide anhydrous (DMSO,
99.9%, MW= 78.13 g mol−1, Sigma-Aldrich) Propylene carbonate anhydrous (PC,
99.7%, MW= 102.09 g mol−1, Sigma-Aldrich), Poly(vinyl alcohol) hydrolysed
(PVA, 98%, Sigma-Aldrich), Lithium perchlorate (LP, 99.99% trace metal basis,
MW= 106.39 g mol−1, Sigma-Aldrich), Poly(3,4-ethylenedioxythiophene) poly-
styrene sulfonate (PEDOT:PSS, 3.0–4.0% in H2O, Sigma-Aldrich), Ethylene glycol
anhydrous (99%, MW= 62.07 g mol−1, Sigma-Aldrich). The conductive adhesive,
used to contact the core substrates to the adapter PCB is the two-component silver-
filled adhesive Elecolit 325 by Panacol.
Substrate preparation. The substrates are structured via laser ablation with a
Trumpf TruMicro 5000 picosecond laser with a laser wavelength of 1030 nm, set at
2.5 W average power.
PUF fabrication. For all printing operations, print heads of the type Fujitsu
Dimatix DMC-11610 with an average droplet volume of 10 pl are used. The
annealing of the substrate for the indium channel formation is done in a box
furnace. The temperature is ramped up to 400 ˚C for 2 hours and is kept at this
temperature level for further 2 hours. For cooling, the substrate is kept in the box
furnace over night. It should be mentioned, that other possibilities for channel
formation can be utilized, such as photonic or chemical curing, to lower processing
temperature68,69.
Ink preparation. The inkjet-printable precursor ink for the indium-oxide channel
is based on dissolved 0.05M (H2InN3O10) in double-deionized water and glycerol
with a ratio of 4:167. The solution is stirred for 2 hours and filtered with a 0.2 μm
polyvinylidene fluoride (PVDF) filter before usage. The CSPE is prepared with 1 wt
% LiClO4, dissolved in 9 wt% PC and stirred for 2 h at ambient room temperature.
In addition, 4.29 wt% PVA is dissolved in 85.71 wt% DMSO and stirred at 90 ˚C
for 2 hours. The two solvents are mixed together and stirred until a clear solution is
obtained67. Before inkjet-printing, the solution is filtered using a 0.2 μm poly-
tetrafluoroethylene filter. In the last step, 70 wt% PEDOT:PSS is dissolved in 30 wt
% ethylene glycol and stirred for 2 hours, then filtered with a 0.2 μm PVDF
membrane before printing.
Mounting inkjet-printed PUF core substrate onto adapter PCB. A mounting
process derived from flip-chip-technology has been selected for integrating the
inkjet-printed PUF core onto the Si-based adapter PCB. The I/O terminals of the
PUF core have to face the contact pads of the adapter PCB. The electrically con-
ductive interconnection is realized with conductive adhesive. The integration
process is based upon a mounting process for surface-mounted devices on low-
temperature flexible substrates70 that is adapted to the present application. The
four axis cartesian handling platform applied for the mounting process is equipped
with an application-specific carrier for the 20 mm × 20mm PUF core glass sub-
strates, a top camera to identify the fiducials on the PCB, a bottom camera to
capture the fiducials on the PUF core glass substrates, a vacuum gripper, and a
pressure time-controlled dispenser tool that is adapted to apply small amounts of
conductive adhesive.
The silver-filled two-component adhesive Elecolit 325 from Panacol is applied
as a conductive adhesive. A small amount of adhesive of 1 g per session is mixed
Fig. 4 Security metrics for the hybrid PUF. a Uniqueness at Vin= 0.4 V, visualized as histogram over the fractional inter-hamming distance for
measurement and simulation data. The mean value of the simulated uniqueness is μs= 50% with a standard deviation of σs= 14.4%. The measured
uniqueness mean value is μm= 51.1% with a standard deviation of σm= 15.5%. b Bit aliasing at Vin= 0.4 V, visualized as histogram for measurement and
simulation data. The mean value of the simulated bit aliasing is μs= 49.8% with a standard deviation of σs= 3.8%. The measured mean value of the bit
aliasing is μm= 44.5% with a standard deviation of σm= 9.3%. c Bit errors for various ambient temperatures over Vin= {0 V, 0.2 V, . . . , 1.0 V} and test
cases including temperature variations. Each data point displays the mean bit error value of 15 measurement samples. d Reliability metric including
temperature, humidity, and supply voltage variations. e Reliability metric including humidity and voltage variations. f Reliability including temperature and
supply voltage variations. d–f The mean value curve fit is done with a second-degree polynomial.
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19324-5
8 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |         (2020) 11:5543 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19324-5 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
manually. In the present application, it has a pot time of ≈90 minutes and is used
to contact four PUF cores with 28 I/O terminals each to the respective adapter
PCBs. The area of the ITO-based conductive layer I/O terminals as well as the gold-
coated contact pads on the adapter PCB are 1 mm × 1mm, respectively. This
dimensioning allows the positioning tolerances of the dispenser needle, the PCB
and the PUF core glass substrates to be compensated. As examples, 56 contact
points were evaluated based upon optical acquisition and image processing,
showing that the diameters of the conductive adhesive in the final setup with the
assembled glass substrate vary between ≈570 μm and 970 μm.
The integration process starts by manually placing the glass substrates with the
printed PUF cores and one adapter PCB in the handling platform. The machine is
initialised and an automated image processing-based routine is used to identify the
exact position of the PCB. The conductive adhesive is then filled into the dispenser
and the position of the dispenser needle is also identified by image processing.
After a pre-dispensing step executed as a precondition for enabling reliable and
reproducible adhesive flow, the adhesive is automatically dispensed onto the PCB
contact pads. The first PUF core is automatically gripped and orientated into the
correct mounting position. In order to orientate the glass substrate, the fiducials of
the PUF core are acquired by the lower camera and identified based upon an image
processing routine. After the glass PUF core has been mounted, the assembled
device is manually removed and the next PCB is placed in the machine. The
mounting process is then rerun with the next PUF core. Assembling one PUF core
on the adapter PCB takes ~10–15 minutes. Final mechanical stability and electrical
conductivity of the interconnection is achieved after 16 hours when curing at room
temperature. Curing can be accelerated at elevated temperatures.
Measurement setup and characterization. A computer-driven automatic
challenge-response readout and measurement system was custom-built for hybrid
PUF characterization. The hybrid PUF platform design was split into the three
functional units (a) microcontroller development board, (b) control logic, and (c)
PUF core adapter, as further explained in Supplementary Fig. 8. and Supplemen-
tary Note 1. This setup enables the printed PUF core instances to be interchanged,
as well as large-scale characterization. The custom-built software implementation
allows challenges to the PUF to be applied automatically and the internal analog
signals measured with a 12-bit MAX1237EUA ADC that lead to response bit
generation. The microcontroller development board is connected to a personal
computer (PC) and powered via USB. The control logic’s components are powered
using the microcontroller development board’s internal 5 V and 3.3 V supply pins.
For dynamic voltage generation of Vin and VDDcore, two internal 12-bit digital-to-
analog converter channels of the microcontroller board are utilized. All our PUF
response measurements were performed in a Weiss WK3 climatic chamber under
controlled ambient temperature and humidity conditions. For PUF bit error and
reliability measures, the ambient temperature was divided into three sections in the
range of 20 ˚C to 60 ˚C. The relative humidity was varied in three sections from
45% and 55%.
PUF security metrics
Uniqueness. The uniqueness metric measures the correlation of the PUF responses
from different instances of the same type, by applying the same challenge. The
lower the correlation, the greater the uniqueness. Ideally, all PUF responses should
differ due to the random intrinsic variations, which implies a uniqueness value of
50%. For two different PUF instances i and j, each with L-bit responses Ri and Rj,










Bit aliasing. The bit aliasing metric is a measure of the 0’s and 1’s distribution
across different PUF entities of the same type. Ideally, both binary values occur
with the same probability of 50%. If the l-th bit of the tested PUF responses has the
same bit value across all PUF entities, the inter-HD of this bit will be zero. As a
result, various PUFs may produce the same responses, which degrades the
uniqueness and leads to false positives in device authentication. The bit aliasing for





Rn;l ´ 100% ð3Þ
Bit errors. Bit errors are bit flips that may occur over time when generating the
same PUF response multiple times. Owing to changing operating conditions, the
regenerated challenge-response pairs might differ, which degrades both the
uniqueness and the reliability scores. We calculate the bit errors (BEn) for PUF
instance n by using the L-bit reference response Rref,n at nominal conditions, and









Reliability. The reliability metric is a measure of the stability of PUF responses
under the impact of varying operating conditions when applying the same chal-
lenge. The ideal value is 100%, which means that PUF responses are not affected by
any environmental impacts such as noise, temperature, humidity, or unstable
voltage supply. The reliability RELn for PUF instance n is calculated by using the L-
bit reference response Rref,n measured at nominal conditions, and the L-bit test










The data sets generated and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the
corresponding author on reasonable request.
Code availability
The codes used for data analysis are available from the corresponding author on
reasonable request.
Received: 22 April 2020; Accepted: 28 September 2020;
References
1. Atzori, L., Iera, A. & Morabito, G. The internet of things: a survey. Comput.
Netw. 54, 2787–2805 (2010).
2. Sfar, A. R., Natalizio, E., Challal, Y. & Chtourou, Z. A roadmap for security
challenges in the internet of things. Digit. Commun. Netw. 4, 118–137 (2018).
3. Wurm, J., Hoang, K., Arias, O., Sadeghi, A.-R. & Jin, Y. Security analysis on
consumer and industrial IoT devices. in 2016 21st Asia and South Pacific
Design Automation Conference, 519–524 (IEEE, 2016).
4. Lee, J.W. et al. A technique to build a secret key in integrated circuits for
identification and authentication applications. in 2004 Symposium on VLSI
Circuits. Digest of Technical Papers, 176–179 (IEEE, 2004).
5. Cortese, P.F., Gemmiti, F., Palazzi, B., Pizzonia, M. & Rimondini, M. Efficient
and practical authentication of PUF-based RFID tags in supply chains. in 2010
IEEE International Conference on RFID-Technology and Applications, 182–188
(IEEE, 2010).
6. Mosenia, A. & Jha, N. K. A comprehensive study of security of internet-of-
things. IEEE Trans. Emerg. Top. Comput. 5, 586–602 (2016).
7. Akmandor, A. O. & Jha, N. K. Smart health care: an edge-side computing
perspective. IEEE Consum. Electron. Mag. 7, 29–37 (2017).
8. Zhang, M., Raghunathan, A. & Jha, N. K. Trustworthiness of medical devices
and body area networks. Proc. IEEE 102, 1174–1188 (2014).
9. Diffie, W. & Hellman, M. New directions in cryptography. IEEE Trans. Inf.
Theory 22, 644–654 (1976).
10. Merkle, R. C. Secure communications over insecure channels. Commun. ACM
21, 294–299 (1978).
11. National Institute of Standards and Technology Specification for the
ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES). Fed. Inf. Process Stand.
Publ. 197 (2001).
12. Gassend, B., Clarke, D., Van Dijk, M. & Devadas, S. Silicon physical random
functions. in Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, 148–160 (ACM, 2002).
13. Gassend, B., Lim, D., Clarke, D., Van Dijk, M. & Devadas, S. Identification and
authentication of integrated circuits. Concurr. Comput. 16, 1077–1098 (2004).
14. Suh, G.E. & Devadas, S. Physical unclonable functions for device
authentication and secret key generation. in 2007 44th ACM/IEEE Design
Automation Conference, 9–14 (ACM/IEEE, 2007).
15. Herder, C., Yu, M.-D., Koushanfar, F. & Devadas, S. Physical unclonable
functions and applications: a tutorial. Proc. IEEE 102, 1126–1141 (2014).
16. Pappu, R., Recht, B., Taylor, J. & Gershenfeld, N. Physical one-way functions.
Science 297, 2026–2030 (2002).
17. Bhargava, M. Reliable, Secure, Efficient Physical Unclonable Functions,
Pittsburgh Carnegie Mellon University (2013).
18. Gao, Y., Al-Sarawi, S. F. & Abbott, D. Physical unclonable functions. Nat.
Electron. 3, 81–91 (2020).
19. Chen, Q., Csaba, G., Lugli, P., Schlichtmann, U. & Rührmair, U. The bistable
ring PUF: a new architecture for strong physical unclonable functions. in 2011
IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust,
134–141 (IEEE, 2011).
20. Garg, A. & Kim, T. Design of SRAM PUF with improved uniformity and
reliability utilizing device aging effect. in 2014 IEEE International Symposium
on Circuits and Systems, 1941–1944 (IEEE, 2014).
21. Kumar, S.S., Guajardo, J., Maes, R., Schrijen, G.-J. & Tuyls, P. The butterfly
PUF protecting IP on every FPGA. in 2008 IEEE International Workshop on
Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust, 67–70 (IEEE, 2008).
22. Morozov, S., Maiti, A. & Schaumont, P. An analysis of delay based PUF
implementations on FPGA. in Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium
on Applied Reconfigurable Computing, 382–387 (Springer, 2010).
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19324-5 ARTICLE
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |         (2020) 11:5543 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19324-5 |www.nature.com/naturecommunications 9
23. Sehwag, V. & Saha, T. TV-PUF: a fast lightweight analog physical unclonable
function. in 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Nanoelectronic and
Information Systems, 182–186 (IEEE, 2016).
24. Yang, K., Dong, Q., Blaauw, D. & Sylvester, D. 2-transistor amplifier-based
physically unclonable function(PUF) with 1.67% native instability. in 2017
IEEE International Solid-State Circuits Conference, 146–147 (IEEE, 2017).
25. Wali, A. et al. Biological physically unclonable function. Commun. Phys. 2, 39
(2019).
26. Ogunseitan, O. A., Schoenung, J. M., Saphores, J.-D. M. & Shapiro, A. The
electronics revolution: from e-wonderland to e-wasteland. Science 326,
670–671 (2009).
27. Forti, V., Baldé, C.P., Kuehr, R. & Bel, G. The Global E-waste Monitor 2020:
Quantities, flows and the circular economy potential. (United Nations
University/United Nations Institute for Training and Research, International
Telecommunication Union, and International Solid Waste Association, Bonn/
Geneva/Rotterdam, 2020).
28. Ferreira, G. et al. Touch-interactive flexible sustainable energy harvester and
self-powered smart card. Adv. Funct. Mater. 30, 1908994 (2020).
29. Street, R. A. et al. From printed transistors to printed smart systems. Proc.
IEEE 103, 607–618 (2015).
30. Suganuma, K. Introduction to Printed Electronics (Springer, New York, 2014).
31. Chang, J. S., Facchetti, A. F. & Reuss, R. A circuits and systems perspective of
organic/printed electronics: review, challenges, and contemporary and
emerging design approaches. IEEE J. Emerg. Sel. Top. Circuits Syst. 7, 7–26
(2017).
32. Barras, R. et al. Printable cellulose-based electroconductive composites for
sensing elements in paper electronics. Flex. Print. Electron. 2, 014006 (2017).
33. Hoeng, F., Denneulin, A. & Bras, J. Use of nanocellulose in printed electronics:
a review. Nanoscale 8, 13131–13154 (2016).
34. Liu, Y. et al. Inkjet-printed unclonable quantum dot fluorescent anti-
counterfeiting labels with artificial intelligence authentication. Nat. Commun.
10, 2409 (2019).
35. Horstmeyer, R., Judkewitz, B., Vellekoop, I. M., Assawaworrarit, S. & Yang, C.
Physical key-protected one-time pad. Sci. Rep. 3, 3543 (2013).
36. Kim, J. et al. Anti-counterfeit nanoscale fingerprints based on randomly
distributed nanowires. Nanotechnology 25, 155303 (2014).
37. Smith, A. F., Patton, P. & Skrabalak, S. E. Plasmonic nanoparticles as a
physically unclonable function for responsive anti-counterfeit
nanofingerprints. Adv. Funct. Mater. 26, 1315–1321 (2016).
38. Mesaritakis, C. et al. Physical unclonable function based on a multi-mode
optical waveguide. Sci. Rep. 8, 9653 (2018).
39. Carro-Temboury, M. R., Arppe, R., Vosch, T. & Sørensen, T. J. An optical
authentication system based on imaging of excitation-selected lanthanide
luminescence. Sci. Adv. 4, e1701384 (2018).
40. Leem, J. W. et al. Edible unclonable functions. Nat. Commun. 11, 1–11 (2020).
41. Gu, Y. et al. Gap-enhanced Raman tags for physically unclonable
anticounterfeiting labels. Nat. Commun. 11, 1–13 (2020).
42. Hu, Z. et al. Physically unclonable cryptographic primitives using self-
assembled carbon nanotubes. Nat. Nanotechnol. 11, 559 (2016).
43. Rahman, F., Shakya, B., Xu, X., Forte, D. & Tehranipoor, M. Security beyond
cmos: fundamentals, applications, and roadmap. IEEE Trans. Integr. Syst. 25,
3420–3433 (2017).
44. Nili, H. et al. Hardware-intrinsic security primitives enabled by analogue state
and nonlinear conductance variations in integrated memristors. Nat. Electron.
1, 197 (2018).
45. Gao, Y., Ranasinghe, D. C., Al-Sarawi, S. F., Kavehei, O. & Abbott, D.
Memristive crypto primitive for building highly secure physical unclonable
functions. Sci. Rep. 5, 12785 (2015).
46. Roberts, J. et al. Using quantum confinement to uniquely identify devices. Sci.
Rep. 5, 16456 (2015).
47. Kuribara, K. et al. Organic physically unclonable function on flexible substrate
operable at 2V for IoT/IoE security applications. Org. Electron. 51, 137–141
(2017).
48. Ogasahara, Y., Kuribara, K., Shintani, M. & Sato, T. Feasibility of a low-power,
low-voltage complementary organic thin film transistor buskeeper physical
unclonable function. Jpn. J. Appl. Phys. 58, SBBG03 (2019).
49. Moon, D.-I. et al. Physically unclonable function by an all-printed carbon
nanotube network. ACS Appl. Electron. Mater. 1, 1162–1168 (2019).
50. Erozan, A. T. et al. Inkjet-printed EGFET-based physical unclonable function
- design, evaluation, and fabrication. IEEE Trans. Integr. Syst. 26, 2935–2946
(2018).
51. Noh, J. et al. Key issues with printed flexible thin film transistors and their
application in disposable RF sensors. Proc. IEEE 103, 554–566 (2015).
52. Bartzsch, M., Kempa, H., Otto, M., Huebler, A. & Zielke, D. Device and
circuit simulation of printed polymer electronics. Org. Electron. 8, 431–438
(2007).
53. Lau, P. H. et al. Fully printed, high performance carbon nanotube thin-film
transistors on flexible substrates. Nano Lett. 13, 3864–3869 (2013).
54. Sowade, E. et al. All-inkjet-printed thin-film transistors: manufacturing
process reliability by root cause analysis. Sci. Rep. 6, 33490 (2016).
55. Zhang, X., Ge, T. & Chang, J. S. Fully-additive printed electronics: transistor
model, process variation and fundamental circuit designs. Org. Electron. 26,
371–379 (2015).
56. Zhou, J., Ge, T., Ng, E. & Chang, J. S. Fully additive low-cost printed
electronics with very low process variations. IEEE Trans. Electron Devices 63,
793–799 (2015).
57. Marques, G. C. et al. Electrolyte-gated fets based on oxide semiconductors:
fabrication and modeling. IEEE Trans. Electron Devices 64, 279–285 (2016).
58. Marques, G. C. et al. Digital power and performance analysis of inkjet printed
ring oscillators based on electrolyte-gated oxide electronics. Appl. Phys. Lett.
111, 102103 (2017).
59. Marques, G.C., Rasheed, F., Aghassi-Hagmann, J. & Tahoori, M.B. From
silicon to printed electronics: a coherent modeling and design flow approach
based on printed electrolyte gated FETs. in 2018 23rd Asia and South Pacific
Design Automation Conference, 658–663 (IEEE, 2018).
60. Feng, X. et al. Impact of intrinsic capacitances on the dynamic performance of
printed electrolyte-gated inorganic field effect transistors. IEEE Trans. Electron
Devices 66, 3365–3370 (2019).
61. Rasheed, F., Golanbari, M. S., Marques, G. C., Tahoori, M. B. & Aghassi-
Hagmann, J. A smooth EKV-based DC model for accurate simulation of
printed transistors and their process variations. IEEE Trans. Electron Devices
65, 667–673 (2018).
62. Rasheed, F., Hefenbrock, M., Beigl, M., Tahoori, M. B. & Aghassi-Hagmann, J.
Variability modeling for printed inorganic electrolyte-gated transistors and
circuits. IEEE Trans. Electron Devices 66, 146–152 (2018).
63. Garlapati, S. K. et al. Electrolyte-gated, high mobility inorganic oxide
transistors from printed metal halides. ACS Appl. Mater. Interfaces 5,
11498–11502 (2013).
64. Baldwin, D. F. & Higgins, L. M. Electronic Packaging and Interconnection
Handbook (McGraw-Hill Handbooks, New York, 2007).
65. Zimmermann, L., Scholz, A., Tahoori, M. B., Aghassi-Hagmann, J. & Sikora,
A. Design and evaluation of a printed analog-based differential physical
unclonable function. IEEE Trans. Integr. Syst. 27, 2498–2510 (2019).
66. Maiti, A., Gunreddy, V. & Schaumont, P. A systematic method to evaluate and
compare the performance of physical unclonable functions. in Embedded
Systems Design with FPGAs. (Springer, New York, 2013).
67. Marques, G. C. et al. Influence of humidity on the performance of composite
polymer electrolyte-gated field-effect transistors and circuits. IEEE Trans.
Electron Devices 66, 2202–2207 (2019).
68. Garlapati, S. K. et al. High performance printed oxide field-effect transistors
processed using photonic curing. Nanotechnology 29, 235205 (2018).
69. Baby, T. T. et al. A general route toward complete room temperature
processing of printed and high performance oxide electronics. ACS Nano 9,
3075–3083 (2015).
70. Gengenbach, U. et al. Automated fabrication of multi-layer printed electronic
circuits using a novel vector ink-jet printing process control and surface
mounting of discrete components. IFAC-Papers OnLine 52, 609–614 (2019).
Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Ministry of Science, Research, and Arts of the state of
Baden-Wuerttemberg, Germany through the Modellierung, Entwurf, Realisierung und
Automatisierung von gedruckter Elektronik und ihren Materialien (MERAGEM) Doc-
toral Program. J.A.-H. acknowledges support by the German Research Foundation
(DFG) under Germany´s Excellence Strategy via the Excellence Cluster 3D Matter Made
to Order (EXC-2082/1 – 390761711). Special thanks go to Dr. Torsten Scherer and
Vanessa Wollersen of the Karlsruhe Nano Micro Facility (KNMF) for providing the SEM
images of our printed transistors (proposal ID: 2019-023028029).
Author contributions
A.Sc., L.Z., A.Si., M.B.T., and J.A.-H., conceived the project. A.Sc. designed the circuits
and fabricated the inkjet-printed devices. L.Z. designed the printed circuit boards hosting
the control logic and implemented the software for automated large-scale characteriza-
tion and security metric evaluation. U.G., L.K., and Z.C. developed the mounting process
to integrate the printed into the silicon-based electronics. A.Sc. and L.Z. performed the
electrical experiments. A.Sc., L.Z., and J.A.-H. analyzed the simulations and experimental
results. J.A.-H. supervised the project. All authors have participated in analyzing the
results and contributed to writing the manuscript.
Funding
Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL.
Competing interests
The authors declare no competing interests.
ARTICLE NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19324-5
10 NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |         (2020) 11:5543 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19324-5 | www.nature.com/naturecommunications
Additional information
Supplementary information is available for this paper at https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-
020-19324-5.
Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to J.A.-H.
Peer review information Nature Communications thanks Derek Abbott and Meng-Day
Yu for their contribution to the peer review of this work. Peer reviewer reports are
available.
Reprints and permission information is available at http://www.nature.com/reprints
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional affiliations.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party
material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless
indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the
article’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory
regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/.
© The Author(s) 2020
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19324-5 ARTICLE
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS |         (2020) 11:5543 | https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-19324-5 |www.nature.com/naturecommunications 11
